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Abstract
Transnational media corporations now wield enormous power and inﬂuence. Never has this
been displayed so starkly and so shockingly as in the revelations that emerged during the
Leveson Inquiry into the culture and ethics of the press in the UK. This paper considers the
implications of the relationship between media elites and political elites for democratic
culture and media reform. The paper argues that the culture of press–politician mutual
interest in which media executives and party leaders collude will continue as long as the
solutions proffered focus on the ethical constraints of professional journalists rather than
wider structural issues relating to plurality of ownership and control and funding of news in
the public interest.
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Introduction: the relationship
between news media and
democracy
A HEALTHY news media is often claimed to be
the life-blood of democracy. News provides,
or at least should provide, the vital resources
for processes of information-gathering, delib-
eration and analysis that enable citizens to
participate in political life and democracy to
function. The ethos and vocation of journal-
ism is entrenched in this relationship with
democracy and its practice. But under condi-
tions of ‘post-democracy’ this relationship,
hinged on a conception of independent
journalism in the public interest linked to
notions of knowledge, political participation
and democratic renewal, has come undone.1
This is brought into sharp relief when we
consider the wily entanglement between
political elites and media elites exposed in
the hacking scandal in the UK in 2011.
News media and post-democracy:
hacking and the Leveson Inquiry
In the summer of 2011 the News of the World,
owned by Rupert Murdoch, stood accused
of illegal, unethical behaviour through the
systematic phone hacking of politicians,
members of the royal family, celebrities,
murder victims and their families. Murdoch
subsequently closed down the News of the
World and several ex-editors and journalists
found themselves under criminal investiga-
tion. Prime Minister David Cameron, pub-
licly embarrassed by his employment as
Director of Communications of Andy Coul-
son (a former editor of News of the World:
2003–7), who was arrested by the Metropoli-
tan Police Service in July 2011 for allegations
of corruption and phone hacking (and
charged in June 2014), then called for a pub-
lic inquiry chaired by Lord Justice Leveson
to investigate the issue. Eighteen months
later the Leveson Report (2012) into the cul-
ture, practices and ethics of the press was
published. The report revealed a sordid rela-
tionship of kowtowing and mutual back-
scratching between politicians and media
owners that raised serious doubts over
whether certain newspapers in the UK could
ever claim to be contributing to democratic
sustenance.
Hackgate, as it became known, portrayed
the mechanisms of a system based on the
corruption of power—both of governing
elites and of mediating elites and the rela-
tions between them. During the Leveson
inquiry it was revealed that a member of the
Cabinet had met executives from Rupert
Murdoch’s empire once every three days on
average since the Coalition was formed.2
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The Inquiry also heard about the close per-
sonal relationships between senior members
of government and senior Murdoch employ-
ees. On 7 October 2009, the day before
David Cameron addressed the Conservative
party conference, Rebekah Brooks, then chief
executive of News International (2009–11)
and former editor of the News of the World
and The Sun, sent Cameron the following
text message:
But seriously I do understand the issue with
the Times. Let’s discuss over country supper
soon. On the party it was because I had
asked a number of NI [News International]
people to Manchester post endorsement and
they were disappointed not to see you. But
as always Sam was wonderful – (and I
thought it was OE’s [Old Etonians] that were
charm personiﬁed!) I am so rooting for you
tomorrow not just as a proud friend but
because professionally we’re deﬁnitely in this
together! Speech of your life? Yes he Cam!3
The Brooks–Cameron relationship is particu-
larly indicative of a culture of press–politi-
cian mutual interest in which media
executives and party leaders work together
to ‘push the same agenda’, in Cameron’s
words. But we also heard four successive
Prime Ministers give evidence to the Leveson
Inquiry into the press admitting they were
‘too close’ to the big media players because
the political stakes were so very high. In
addition, the inquiry revealed the systematic
invasions of privacy by headline-hungry
journalists that wrecked the lives of ordinary
people on a daily basis; the lies and deceit of
senior newspaper ﬁgures; and a highly
politicised and corrupt police force also in
league with media power.4 Rebekah Brooks
admitted to paying police for information in
a House of Commons Select Committee in
2003 but denied it in 2011 (BBC News UK,
15 April 2011), and we discovered that over
a quarter of the police public affairs depart-
ment were previous employers of the News
of the World.5 It is hardly surprising, then,
that political parties, the police and other
institutions were exposed as reluctant to
investigate wrongdoing in the news media,
hinder the expansion of large media
conglomerates or introduce new regulation
of news organisations and journalistic
practice.
But the problem of phone hacking has a
much broader and deeper reach than any
slippage in ethical practice would seem to
suggest, and rests not with the individual
journalists but with the system of news pro-
duction of which they are part. The reasons
hinge on the increasing entanglement of
political and media elites as news coverage
has taken on an ever more important role in
policy-making and elections6 and fewer and
fewer people vote;7 on the failure of the
Press Complaints Commission8 (the old
newspaper industry watchdog) to uphold
ethical standards and enable adequate self-
regulation of journalists;9 all alongside the
broken business model of newspapers with
plummeting circulation and readership ﬁg-
ures and the migration of classiﬁed advertis-
ing to online sites such as Craigslist in the
US and Gumtree and eBay in the UK.10
At a time when resources are scarce and
where there is a pressure to meet multiple
deadlines across a whole series of news plat-
forms, it is easy to see how the already con-
strained autonomy of journalists and their
freedom to act ethically toward the collective
gains of the profession can be eroded for the
competitive gain of the commercial newspa-
per. Combine the faster and shallower corpo-
rate journalism of the digital age11 with the
need to pull in readers for commercial rather
than journalistic reasons and it is not difﬁ-
cult to see how the values of professional
journalism are quickly cast aside in order to
indulge in sensationalism, trade in gratuitous
spectacles and deal in dubious emotionalism.
These economic drivers cannot be underesti-
mated but they do not tell the whole story.
Rather, the concerns spring from a thor-
oughly marketised and deregulated news-
paper industry, many parts of which have
long since relegated the motive of the press
as fourth estate holding truth to power to
the sidelines. As Trevor Kavanagh, associate
editor of The Sun, noted in his own evidence
to Leveson:
. . . news is as saleable a commodity as any
other. Newspapers are commercial, competi-
tive businesses, not a public service.12
News in these formulations is conceived of
as being primarily for proﬁt—a marketplace
that operates on market principles. Treating
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news in this way is part of a much broader
political shift in focus from citizenship to
consumerism and from states to markets.
But of course, news is no ordinary commod-
ity—it offers the possibility of directing the
public conversation and hence is of rele-
vance to politicians keen to convince voters
of the beneﬁts of their particular policy for-
mulations. This puts news proprietors in a
particular position of power. As the owner
of the London Evening Standard and the Inde-
pendent, Russian billionaire Evgeny Lebedev,
tweeted after his appearance at Leveson:
‘Forgot to tell #Leveson that it’s unreason-
able to expect individuals to spend £millions
on newspapers and not have access to
politicians’.
Concentration of media
ownership
When news proprietors accumulate excessive
power and inﬂuence, the problems associ-
ated with this power are exacerbated. In
the UK, a thoroughly marketised and
deregulated newspaper industry has led to
unchecked media concentration over several
decades, allowing some media groups to
amass vast amounts of revenue along with
social and political inﬂuence, with adverse
consequences for ethical journalism and
democracy. Currently, just three companies
control 71 per cent of UK national newspa-
per circulation, while only ﬁve groups con-
trol 80 per cent of combined print and online
readership.13 Rupert Murdoch and family
were recently positioned at number 33 of
Forbes Magazine’s list of the world’s most
powerful people, with a net worth of $13.4
billion.14 The work of Davis (2002) and Dean
(2011) shows how such patterns of domi-
nance and inﬂuence have also contributed to
certain public policy areas—law and order,
drugs, asylum seekers, immigration, Europe
—being avoided or dealt with differently for
fear of either hostile reporting or media
owner conﬂict.15
In evidence to a House of Lords select com-
mittee in 2007, Rupert Murdoch said that he
simply acted like ‘a traditional proprietor’ in
regard to The Sun and the News of the World;
he did not interfere except ‘on major issues,
such as which party to back in a general elec-
tion or policy on Europe’.16 On 21 April the
Independent newspaper reported that Mur-
doch had told journalists at The Sun that if the
Labour party (then led by Ed Miliband) got
into power, then the future of the company
was at stake. He then directed them to be
more aggressive in their attacks against
Labour and more positive about the Conser-
vative party. Miliband’s viliﬁcation by certain
sections of the press was vicious and unre-
lenting—he was decried as weird-looking, a
geek, terrible at eating bacon sandwiches; his
Dad was a Marxist, they announced, and he
did one over on his brother.
Market dominance of news media results
in an excess of power and unruly political
inﬂuence that breeds fear. Fear in politicians
scared of their careers being wrecked and
lives ruined by negative publicity, along with
their parties’ chances of re-election. Fear in
employees too intimidated to stand up to a
bullying culture where market-oriented man-
agers place commercial priorities above jour-
nalistic responsibility and integrity. Of
course, it is not only journalists whose free-
dom is circumscribed by corporate compli-
ance. Our ability to exercise our own
democratic freedom as ordinary members of
the public is premised on the basic fact that
governments are not distorted by private
interests of multimedia conglomerates. When
governments as well as journalists are behol-
den to corporate power, then freedom is hard
to come by for all but the most powerful.
Claims regarding the damage wrought by
excessive concentration of media ownership
are often dismissed as outmoded and irrele-
vant in a digital age where information
abundance abounds. However, even online
mainstream established news outlets still
dominate our news consumption across all
platforms, with increasingly homogenous
content. In a nine-country study of news
websites, Curran et al. (2013) note that
‘leading websites around the world repro-
duce the same kind of news as legacy
media. These websites favour the voices of
authority and expertise over those of cam-
paigning organisations and the ordinary citi-
zen’.17 McChesney (2014) also notes how
the global power of new digital distributors
has created the greatest monopolies in eco-
nomic history, with new digital industries
moving from competitive to oligopolistic to
monopolistic at a furious pace until the
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internet has come to rest in the hands of a
very few giant global corporations.18 He
argues that the hyper-commercialism, adver-
tising and monopoly markets now found
online enhance rather than disrupt the con-
tours of capitalism and lead to rampant
depoliticisation and undemocratic, commer-
cial media policy, as the point of govern-
ment regulation pivots on helping corporate
media maximise their proﬁts rather than
advancing the public interest.
Conclusion
The hacking scandal reveals the mechanisms
of a system of news provision based on the
corruption of power, and one that displays
many of the hallmarks of neoliberal practice.
This speaks to a ‘post-democracy’ charac-
terised by increasing deregulation of corpo-
rate media interests that allows excessive
inﬂuence over and inappropriate interference
in the political public sphere; that ever more
commodiﬁes the news such that its only value
is in the proﬁt it generates; wherein account-
ability is lost and the logic of capital becomes
the sole driver of commercial newspaper
practice. Furthermore, the power of multina-
tional media corporations is not dispersed in
the age of new media; rather, new forms of
media capital come to the fore. The solution
does not lie simply in reform of unethical
journalism (even if the Leveson recommenda-
tions were fully implemented).19 An indepen-
dent and effective system of self-regulation of
the press is to be welcomed, but will only ever
deal partially with the problem. Ensuring
communities have access to a diverse range of
media and political systems are not beholden
to corporate pressures also requires controls
to prevent the excessive concentration of
media ownership—both online and ofﬂine—
and a means of encouraging new, non-proﬁt,
public interest news media to emerge and
ﬂourish (for example, by allowing such pub-
lishers to claim charitable status). Only then
can the relationship between news media and
democracy have any chance of survival.
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